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Technical Analysis

Section-by-Section Analysis of the KP Mines and Minerals Act, 2025

Introduction

This technical analysis examines specific provisions of the Khyber Pakhtunkhwa Mines and Minerals Act, 2025, highlighting areas of concern related to provincial sovereignty, economic control, and governance. The analysis is organized by major sections of the Act and includes direct quotes from bill text, comparative analysis with previous legislation, and impact assessments.

Each section is evaluated according to three dimensions of concern:

Legal Implications Constitutional alignment and legal framework concerns
Economic Impact Financial, resource management, and benefit distribution effects
Governance Administrative control, transparency, and accountability issues

This analysis should be read alongside the full text of the Act for complete context. References to specific sections are provided to facilitate cross-referencing with the original bill text.

Table of Contents

1. Definitions and Scope (Sections 1-2)

Expanded Definition of "Strategic Minerals"

High Concern Legal

Section 2(zz) introduces an expanded definition of "strategic minerals" that includes a much broader range of minerals than the 2017 Act. This expanded definition has significant implications for provincial control of mineral resources.

Section 2(zz) "Strategic Minerals" means lithium, cobalt, copper, rare earth elements, gold, silver, and such other minerals as the Federal Government may, by notification in the official Gazette, declare to be strategic minerals;

Comparative Analysis:

The 2017 Act limited "strategic minerals" to uranium and rare earth elements. The 2025 Act significantly expands this list and, crucially, adds a provision allowing the Federal Government to unilaterally declare additional minerals as "strategic" without provincial consultation.

Implications:

This expanded definition creates a mechanism through which the Federal Government can progressively claim control over additional mineral resources that would otherwise fall under provincial jurisdiction per the 18th Amendment to the Constitution.

The open-ended nature of the definition ("such other minerals") without requiring provincial consent creates a mechanism for unlimited federal expansion of control over provincial mineral resources.

Redefinition of "Owner" and Rights

Medium Concern Economic

Section 2(s) redefines "owner" in relation to mines and minerals in a way that diminishes provincial rights and strengthens federal control.

Section 2(s) "Owner" in relation to mines and minerals includes the Licensing Authority, the Federal Government, or any person or entity holding rights over mines or minerals under this Act;

Comparative Analysis:

The 2017 Act defined ownership primarily through the provincial government and provincial entities. The new definition dilutes provincial claims by equating federal ownership claims with provincial ones and giving precedence to the Licensing Authority (which has federal representation).

Implications:

This redefinition creates a legal foundation for federal entities to claim mineral rights that previously would have been clearly provincial. The economic implications include potential revenue diversion away from the province and toward federal accounts or federally-favored entities.

2. Administrative Structure (Sections 3-7)

Licensing Authority Composition

High Concern Governance

Section 3 establishes a Licensing Authority with significant federal representation, undermining provincial autonomy in mineral resource management.

Section 3(1) For the purpose of all minerals, other than minor minerals, there shall be established a Licensing Authority, which shall consist of: (a) Director General; (Chairman) (b) Additional Director General; (Member) (c) Representative of the Ministry of Energy (Petroleum Division), not below the rank of Joint Secretary; (Member) (d) Representative of Ministry of Finance, not below the rank of Joint Secretary; (Member)

Comparative Analysis:

The 2017 Act established provincial control through the KP Mineral Development Board with no federal representation. The 2025 Act's Licensing Authority includes two senior federal representatives with significant decision-making power over provincial resources.

Implications:

This structure creates a governance mechanism through which federal interests can control or veto provincial decisions about mineral development. The representation from the Ministry of Finance creates a direct channel for federal influence over revenue matters.

The absence of local community representation or elected provincial officials further weakens provincial sovereignty and democratic accountability.

Powers and Functions of the Licensing Authority

High Concern Legal Economic

Section 6 grants extensive powers to the Licensing Authority that exceed typical regulatory functions and create significant provincial sovereignty concerns.

Section 6(1) The Licensing Authority shall have the following powers and functions: (a) grant, refuse, suspend or cancel mineral titles; (b) prescribe standard terms and conditions for mineral titles; (c) prescribe the areas in respect of which mineral titles may be granted; (d) determine fees, rents, royalties, compensation and damages payable under this Act; (e) receive and dispose of applications for the grant, renewal, assignment, surrender, or cancellation of mineral titles; (i) direct operations to be conducted on mines by the Government agencies; (k) enter into agreements on behalf of the Provincial Government with Federal Government, foreign governments, private national investors, international investors or any other persons;
Problematic Authority Constitutional Concern
Power to "direct operations" (6(1)(i)) Creates direct federal operational control of provincial mines
Power to enter agreements (6(1)(k)) Supersedes provincial government's treaty and contract powers
Fee/royalty determination (6(1)(d)) Removes provincial fiscal autonomy guaranteed in 18th Amendment

Implications:

The powers granted to this federally-influenced Authority create a mechanism to bypass provincial government authority entirely in most significant mineral development decisions. The power to "enter into agreements on behalf of the Provincial Government" is particularly concerning as it effectively subordinates the provincial government's treaty power to an appointed body with federal representation.

3. Licensing Regime (Sections 8-20)

Special Procedures for Strategic Minerals

High Concern Economic

Section 12 establishes special licensing procedures for "strategic minerals" that bypass normal provincial oversight mechanisms.

Section 12(3) Notwithstanding anything contained in this Act, the Licensing Authority may, in consultation with the Federal Government, grant exploration licenses or mining leases for strategic minerals to: (a) a company owned or controlled by the Federal Government; or (b) a joint venture between a company owned or controlled by the Federal Government and a private entity; or (c) a joint venture between a company owned or controlled by the Federal Government and a foreign entity through government-to-government arrangements.

Comparative Analysis:

The 2017 Act had no comparable provision. All minerals, regardless of classification, were subject to the same provincial licensing requirements. This new provision creates a separate licensing track that heavily favors federal entities.

Economic Impact Analysis:

This provision creates a mechanism through which the most valuable minerals (including gold, copper, lithium) can be diverted to federal control through federally-owned or controlled entities, bypassing competitive bidding processes.

With the expanded definition of "strategic minerals" (Section 2(zz)), this creates a system where potentially unlimited mineral resources can be placed under this special federal licensing regime, severely limiting provincial economic benefit.

Mineral Titles Registry

Medium Concern Governance

Section 10 establishes a Mineral Titles Registry with inadequate transparency provisions and potential for governance issues.

Section 10(1) The Licensing Authority shall establish and maintain a Mineral Titles Registry in which shall be recorded: (a) all applications for the grant of mineral titles; (b) all mineral titles granted, renewed, refused, suspended, or cancelled; (c) all assignments, surrenders, and transfers of mineral titles; (d) all charges, liens, or other encumbrances created in respect of mineral titles.

Governance Analysis:

While the registry itself is standard for mineral governance, the Act notably lacks provisions for:

  • Public access to registry information
  • Disclosure of beneficial ownership
  • Transparency of contract terms
  • Provincial government access rights

Implications:

The lack of explicit transparency provisions creates a governance risk where licensing decisions, terms, and beneficial ownership information can remain hidden from public and provincial government scrutiny. This undermines accountability and creates conditions where corruption and conflicts of interest can flourish.

4. Fiscal Provisions (Sections 21-35)

Revenue Allocation Mechanism

High Concern Economic

Section 29 creates a revenue allocation mechanism that diverts significant mineral revenue away from the province.

Section 29(2) All royalties, fees, rents, and other charges collected under this Act shall be allocated as follows: (a) 30% to the Provincial Consolidated Fund; (b) 20% to a Special Development Fund for mining areas; (c) 25% to the Licensing Authority for operational expenses and infrastructure development; (d) 25% to the Federal Mineral Development Fund established under Section 30.

Comparative Analysis:

The 2017 Act directed 80% of mineral revenues to the Provincial Consolidated Fund and 20% to local development. The new allocation reduces direct provincial revenue from 80% to 30% - a 62.5% reduction in provincial control of mineral wealth.

Economic Impact Analysis:

This arrangement creates a severe economic sovereignty issue where the province retains direct control of only 30% of revenue generated from its natural resources, with another 20% restricted to specified local uses.

The 25% allocation to the Licensing Authority (which has federal representation) creates potential for federal influence over a quarter of provincial mineral revenue.

The direct 25% allocation to a Federal Fund represents a direct transfer of provincial resource wealth to federal control - a severe violation of the resource sovereignty principles established in the 18th Amendment.

Financial Impact Estimate:

Based on projected mineral revenues of 100 billion rupees annually:

Allocation 2017 Act 2025 Act Change
Provincial Control 80 billion Rs 30 billion Rs -50 billion Rs
Local Development 20 billion Rs 20 billion Rs No change
Licensing Authority 0 25 billion Rs +25 billion Rs
Federal Fund 0 25 billion Rs +25 billion Rs

Federal Mineral Development Fund

High Concern Legal Governance

Section 30 establishes a Federal Mineral Development Fund that receives 25% of provincial mineral revenue but lacks provincial oversight.

Section 30(1) There shall be established a Federal Mineral Development Fund to be administered by the Federal Government. Section 30(3) The Fund shall be used for: (a) development of mining infrastructure at the national level; (b) research and development in mining technology; (c) strategic initiatives related to mineral development; (d) such other purposes as the Federal Government may determine.

Constitutional Analysis:

The establishment of a federal fund that receives provincial mineral revenue with no provincial representation in its governance structure appears to violate the 18th Amendment's provisions for provincial resource control.

The phrase "such other purposes as the Federal Government may determine" creates an unrestricted ability for the federal government to use provincial mineral wealth for any purpose it chooses.

There are no transparency or reporting requirements to the province regarding how these funds are spent, creating a significant accountability deficit.

5. Environmental Governance (Sections 36-45)

Environmental Protection Provisions

Medium Concern Governance

Section 38 establishes environmental protection requirements that weaken provincial environmental oversight.

Section 38(1) The holder of a mineral title shall: (a) conduct operations in accordance with good mining industry practice; (b) comply with environmental laws and regulations to the extent they are not inconsistent with this Act; (c) minimize and mitigate environmental impacts from operations.

Comparative Analysis:

The 2017 Act required strict compliance with all provincial environmental laws. The 2025 Act's phrase "to the extent they are not inconsistent with this Act" creates a mechanism to override provincial environmental laws.

Implications:

This provision creates a legal basis for mining operators to avoid compliance with provincial environmental standards by claiming they are "inconsistent" with the Act.

The vague reference to "good mining industry practice" without defined standards creates a weak governance framework subject to interpretation that may favor industry interests over environmental protection.

Environmental Compliance Monitoring

High Concern Governance

Section 42 establishes environmental monitoring provisions that bypass provincial environmental agencies.

Section 42(1) The Licensing Authority shall monitor compliance with environmental requirements under this Act. Section 42(3) Notwithstanding any other law, the environmental compliance certification provided by the Licensing Authority shall be deemed sufficient for purposes of compliance with environmental standards for mining operations.

Governance Analysis:

This provision creates a concerning governance structure where the same authority granting mining licenses is also responsible for environmental compliance certification, creating an inherent conflict of interest.

Implications:

The provision "notwithstanding any other law" appears designed to override provincial environmental protection laws and agencies.

The federally-influenced Licensing Authority becomes the final arbiter of environmental compliance, effectively removing this authority from provincial environmental agencies.

This creates a significant risk where environmental standards may be compromised in favor of mining development, as the same authority responsible for promoting mining is also certifying environmental compliance.

6. Enforcement Mechanisms (Sections 46-70)

Inspection and Enforcement Authority

Medium Concern Governance

Section 50 establishes inspection and enforcement provisions that weaken provincial oversight mechanisms.

Section 50(1) The Licensing Authority shall have exclusive authority to inspect and enforce provisions of this Act. Section 50(3) No other inspection or enforcement action under any other law shall be initiated against a mineral title holder without prior approval of the Licensing Authority.

Comparative Analysis:

The 2017 Act maintained standard provincial inspection regimes. The 2025 Act creates a single enforcement authority and explicitly blocks other provincial agencies from enforcement actions without prior approval.

Implications:

This provision creates a significant barrier to provincial labor, safety, and environmental agencies enforcing their respective laws in mining operations.

The requirement for "prior approval" from the Licensing Authority (with federal representation) effectively subordinates all provincial regulatory agencies to this federal-influenced authority in matters related to mining operations.

Dispute Resolution Mechanism

High Concern Legal

Sections 65-70 establish a dispute resolution framework that restricts access to provincial courts.

Section 65(1) All disputes arising under this Act shall be resolved through the dispute resolution mechanisms established in this Part. Section 67(2) No civil court shall have jurisdiction to entertain any suit or proceeding in respect of any matter which the Licensing Authority or Appellate Tribunal is empowered by or under this Act to determine. Section 70(1) Appeals from decisions of the Appellate Tribunal shall lie only to the Supreme Court of Pakistan.

Legal Analysis:

This framework creates a specialized legal channel that bypasses provincial courts entirely. Appeals go directly from the Appellate Tribunal to the Supreme Court, eliminating the normal role of provincial high courts.

Implications:

This provision effectively removes provincial judicial oversight of mining activities, centralizing legal authority at the federal level.

The explicit exclusion of civil court jurisdiction removes important checks and balances that would normally protect provincial and community interests.

This creates significant barriers to justice for local communities affected by mining operations, as they must navigate specialized tribunals rather than accessing provincial courts.

7. Overriding Provisions (Sections 118-120)

Override Clause

Highest Concern Legal

Section 118 contains an override clause that is fundamentally concerning for provincial sovereignty.

Section 118 The provisions of this Act shall have effect notwithstanding anything to the contrary contained in any other law, rule or regulation for the time being in force.

Constitutional Analysis:

This override clause places this Act above all other provincial laws, effectively creating a legal mechanism to nullify any provincial legislation that might contradict or limit provisions in this Act.

Implications:

This represents one of the most severe violations of provincial legislative sovereignty in the Act. It effectively subordinates all other provincial laws to this federally-influenced mining legislation.

Provincial laws on environmental protection, labor rights, water resources, land use, and indigenous rights can all be overridden by this clause if deemed "contrary" to the Act's provisions.

This clause creates a legal foundation to systematically dismantle provincial authority across multiple sectors whenever mining interests are involved.

Power to Remove Difficulties

High Concern Governance

Section 120 grants broad powers to modify the Act's application without legislative approval.

Section 120(1) If any difficulty arises in giving effect to any provision of this Act, the Government may, by notification in the official Gazette, make such order, not inconsistent with the provisions of this Act, as may appear to it to be necessary or expedient for the purpose of removing the difficulty.

Governance Analysis:

While "removal of difficulties" clauses are not uncommon, this provision is unusually broad in allowing modifications to the Act's implementation without legislative oversight.

Implications:

This provision creates a mechanism for the executive branch to substantially modify the implementation of the Act without returning to the legislature.

The phrase "necessary or expedient" provides extremely wide latitude for making changes, potentially allowing substantial modifications to be made through simple notifications.

The lack of any time limitation on this power (often such clauses are limited to 1-2 years after enactment) makes this an ongoing governance risk with no sunset provision.

Conclusion

This technical analysis has identified seven major areas of concern in the Khyber Pakhtunkhwa Mines and Minerals Act, 2025. The Act systematically undermines provincial sovereignty through mechanisms including:

  • An expanded definition of strategic minerals that creates unlimited federal control potential
  • Administrative structures with significant federal representation and influence
  • Special licensing procedures that favor federal entities
  • Revenue allocation mechanisms that divert 70% of mineral wealth away from direct provincial control
  • Environmental provisions that override provincial environmental laws and agencies
  • Enforcement mechanisms that subordinate provincial regulatory agencies
  • An override clause that places this Act above all other provincial legislation

The cumulative effect of these provisions is to create a comprehensive framework for federal control of provincial mineral resources that fundamentally contradicts the principles of provincial resource sovereignty established in the 18th Amendment to the Constitution.

This analysis should be read alongside the full text of the Act for complete context. We recommend that stakeholders carefully consider these provisions and their implications for Khyber Pakhtunkhwa's constitutional rights and economic development.

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